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Researchers often overlook the rela-
tion between Russian and Nordic invest-
ment capital; and even less attention is 
paid to studying the competition between 
the two. Yet this subject can be of particu-
lar relevance to the areas that are geo-
graphically, historically and culturally 
close to both Russia and the Nordic coun-
tries. Thus, the aim of this article is to 
analyze how the competition between 
Russian and Nordic capital investment is 
played out in the Baltic States. The study 
discusses the principles of Russian and 
Nordic investment in the Baltic, and sug-
gests ways to regulate these relations. To 
this end, we compare the investment con-
ditions created in the Baltic States for 
both Russian and Nordic investors. The 
analysis shows that most of the Baltic 
market is controlled by the Nordic capital, 
which blocks the arrival of Russian in-
vestment to the Baltic states. With a nod to 
a number of previous studies, the authors 
of this article suggest some adjustments to 
the theory of foreign direct investment. 
The study will be also of practical interest 
to those Russian investors who are see-
king entry points to the Baltic markets. 
 
Key words: Russian capital, the Baltic 
States, Nordic capital, investment, market 
development theory, energy, banking, real 
estate, the regional dimension, the invest-
ment climate, EU 
 
Introduction 
 
An analysis of current investment 
presence of foreign capital in the Bal-
tics leads to a conclusion that compe-
tition in this sphere is created mostly 
by the Russian and the Nordic capital. 
This competition is most pro-
nounced in the field of energy, where 
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the Nordic investors strive to put competitive pressure on Russia. The Rus-
sian capital encounters the strongest resistance from the Nordic capital in the 
finance industry (banking, insurance, leasing, and pension funds). The Nor-
dic investors use traditional and covert forms of competition to jeopardize 
new Russian investment and simultaneously suppress any activity of the exis-
ting Russian investment properties. An interesting situation has developed in 
the Baltics real estate market (mostly, the residential segment), where real 
estate is usually sold by Nordic companies and bought by Russians. Such 
transactions are beneficial for Nordic businesses and, at the same time, in-
crease Russian real estate assets in the Baltics. In this case, the Baltics serve 
as a platform for business between the Russian and the Nordic capitals. 
The above concerns direct investments. As to portfolio investments, the-
re is no strong competition, since the Nordic capital has almost gained total 
monopoly in this segment in the Baltics both in organisational and absolute 
terms, leaving little space for Russian or any other foreign capital. 
As to the current trends, both facts and statistics show that, over the past 
15 years, the Nordic capital has been more effective than the Russian capital 
in exploring the Baltic investment space. Moreover, the increase in the role 
of the Nordic capital is a result of winning over positions that used to be held 
by the Russian capital. 
 
Conceptual framework for competition 
 
The Russian-Nordic conflict of interests in the Baltics has deep historical 
roots. It is only natural that today it has transformed into a competition of 
capitals. There is a scientific rationale for such conceptual confrontation be-
tween the Russian and the Nordic capitals in the Baltics. Studies (Vernon, 
USA; Johanson, a proponent of the Uppsala model, Sweden) of capital inter-
nationalisation (moving to foreign markets) show that firms first begin their 
foreign operations in the countries that are culturally and historically close to 
them [1, p. 36—42]. Therefore, the Baltics are a ‘comfort zone’ for both the 
Russian and the Nordic capitals. It is evident that both capitals target the 
Baltic space considering it to be the closest to their ‘motherland’ [2, p. 140]. 
Of course, there is a need to differentiate between the Baltic States in view 
of their historical development. Estonia leans towards Northern Europe, but 
serves as a platform for competition between the Russian and the Nordic 
capitals. In Lithuania, cooperation between the Russian and the Nordic capi-
tal is ‘diluted’ with Polish and Belarusian presence. In Latvia, the German 
capital, rather active until recently, is being gradually replaced by the Nordic 
capital leaving enough room for it to compete the Russian capital. 
Against this background, one cannot but pay attention to the fact that the 
systematic deterioration in the Baltics-Russian relations is often preceded by 
the Nordic capital ‘attacking’ Russian positions in the Baltics. Moreover, 
one hypothesis suggests that chronic conflicts between the Baltics and Rus-
sia might be sustained by the Nordic countries. It seems that, in most cases, 
Nordic investors regulate this process to create unfavourable investment en-
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vironment for the Russian capital and, therefore, generate additional com-
petitive advantages for themselves in — considering that it is the Nordic 
capital that dominates the Baltic market at the moment. 
 
Development of the Nordic capital in the Baltics 
 
After regaining independence in the early 1990s, the Baltics — as well 
as the other countries of the post-Soviet space — initiated a transformation 
from planned to market economy. Naturally, market formation drew atten-
tion of foreign capital. The geographical and historical traditions determined 
the origin of this capital: it was coming predominantly from the Nordic 
countries, which fits into the pattern of businesses starting their operations 
from culturally and historically close countries [1]. As to the profile, the lea-
ding role is played by Swedish investments1. 
At first, the Nordic capital started gradually entering the market through 
purchasing small shares from the local capital, eventually increasing and ex-
panding their presence but avoiding publicity. As a result, by the late 1990s, 
the SEB group owned 95 % of the largest local bank, Vilniaus Bankas. The 
new owners deliberately kept the original Lithuanian name and positioned it as 
a bank of the national capital. This also holds true for another Baltic bank — 
Hansa — created in Estonia by local business, from whom the bank was 
bought by Swedbank, which also preferred to remain incognito. 
Nordic investors were guided by several considerations. In particular, 
they took into account that the population of the Baltics is distrustful and 
prefers national product, all other things being equal. Moreover, Baltic busi-
nesses managed to persuade the Nordic investors of their exclusive experi-
ence in dealing with Russia. Therefore, in the 1990s, the Nordic capital en-
tered Russia and developed its operations disguised as Baltic banks and 
companies. As a result, Baltic banks gained the reputation for being reliable 
and influential institutions in Russia. Later, as the Nordic investors started to 
feel comfortable in the Baltic and Russian markets, they abandoned these 
practices and disclosed their actual brands, under which they are operating in 
Russia today. At the same time, Baltic businesses continue to exploit their 
established reputation and thus instil the idea of attractiveness of Baltic na-
tional credit and business organisations in the Russian population. Their 
message finds a receptive audience among Russians who keep their money 
in the Baltic banks despite the cases of bank insolvency and rescue (Lithua-
nia’s Snoras and Latvia’s Citadele). 
 
Energy 
 
Economic agenda of the Baltic States is full (perhaps, too the brink) of 
different energy projects. These include power cables between Finland and 
Estonia (Estlink-1, Estlink-2), Sweden and Lithuania/Latvia (NordBalt), 
construction of LNG terminals (Latvia — Liepaja, Estonia — Muuga, Pald-
iski), and a gas pipeline between Poland and Lithuania (LitPol). 
                                                     
1 SEB and Swedbank financial groups. 
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The mere enumeration of the projects raises questions as to their practi-
cality for the Baltics. In this connection, one can consider several motives 
that could explain the participation of the Baltics in the energy projects, 
whose total power capacity exceeds all national needs. 
The first — more evident — motive is the creation of an independent ener-
gy source to meet industrial and household needs. These needs can be meas-
ured, since it is possible to calculate the amount of power consumed at the 
moment and that to be consumed in the future. This can be beneficial in two 
respects — saving resources spent today on importing power and redirecting 
them to other purposes, in particular, eliminating possible obstacles to ex-
panded reproduction. One apparent criterion for rational expenditure on pro-
ject implementation is the cost of a unit of power. If the cost of producing a 
unit of power is lower than that of imported power, the project is cost-effec-
tive; otherwise, the competitiveness of manufactured goods will decrease, 
i. e. the result will be opposite to the expected. However, the industrial moti-
ve is not decisive for the Baltics, which show a trend towards deindustria-
lisation caused by the alignment of the Baltics national economies with the 
EU structure of the division of labour. 
The second motive is using cheap energy sources to increase investment 
attractiveness. In this case, energy prices are crucial in attracting investors, 
since the other factors cannot be improved. For instance, natural resources 
cannot be replenished artificially — the Baltics do not have mineral re-
sources of such composition or plenitude that could interest serious inves-
tors. Nor can be the Baltics considered attractive from the perspective of 
human resources. Traditionally, the pillars of their qualified workforce were 
specialists from the other Soviet republics, and most of them repatriated or 
immigrated as soon as the Baltics regained their independence. The Baltics 
only partially succeed in overcoming this stereotype as today, many Baltic 
specialists take unqualified jobs in the EU. 
The third motive is generating power for export. Today, there are objec-
tive conditions for the implementation of this scenario, since, in the Soviet 
times, the Baltics were part of the united Soviet energy system, which made 
it possible to transfer power from one republic into another in a short time. 
The scheme is still operational. In case of emergency, the Baltics will re-
ceive power form Russian or Belarus in 3 to 5 minutes. After the disconnec-
tion sought for by the local authorities, the Baltics will find themselves in en-
ergy isolation, also determined by its geographical position. Therefore, export, 
i. e. exchange of power with Russia and Belarus, will become senseless. 
The fourth motive is the opportunity to benefit from energy transit. 
There are two options — transboundary transit between the Baltics and tran-
sit to Poland and the Nordic countries. Today, the Baltics are considering 
nationalising oil pipelines and transmission lines running through their terri-
tories to ensure stable income in the future. 
It is worth noting that the Baltic officials do not mention either of these 
motives in public speeches stressing that all these projects pursue a single 
goal — reducing energy dependence on Russia. 
V. Olenchenko 
 25
 
Overcoming energy dependence 
 
The term ‘energy dependence’ was coined rather recently — in the 
1990s. At first, it concerned the Baltics, which regained independence in that 
period but allegedly remained dependent on Russia due to surviving bilateral 
economic ties, which was chiefly manifested in Russia importing Baltic ag-
ricultural produce and the Baltics importing Russian natural gas and power. 
The term was coined to appeal for help from Western Europe in retaining the 
identity of the Baltics, in particular, through securing the EU membership. 
Western politicians popularized the notion. Later, it came to characterise 
Russia-EU relations in general in terms of Russian hydrocarbon exports to 
Europe. It has become one of the key mottos describing the attitude of Wes-
tern partners towards Russia. The term has an exclusively anti-Russian con-
notation. 
It is worth stressing that professional economic dictionaries do not fea-
ture related entries. The concept of energy dependence comes from biology, 
where it denotes energy consumption by different objects in the form of ex-
change as a key condition for sustaining life. In the English language, the 
term ‘volatility’ is often used in related contexts, probably, in order to por-
tray Russia as an unreliable partner. 
Regardless of the anti-Russian sentiment embedded in the term ‘energy 
dependence’, it has two serious flaws that allow us to question its relevance 
to economic theory and practice. The first relates to the fact that the energy 
sources serving as the manifestation of energy dependence are considered 
not as goods, which they, in effect, are, but as a measure of dependence. The 
second flaw relates to that the term disorientates manufactures and consum-
ers, who are being persuaded that that the latter do not enter a relationship of 
exchanging goods with the energy supplier, but engage in a dangerous liai-
son with unpredicted consequences. 
As to the more pedestrian aspects, power generation in each of the Baltic 
States relies on several unique facilities — a hydropower plant on the river 
Daugava in Latvia, (until recently) the Ignalina NPP in Lithuania (70 % of 
consumption), and CHPP burning local shale in Estonia (50 % of consump-
tion). Neither of these sources has anything to do with Russia. 
There are different approaches to bringing the motto of energy inde-
pendence to life. For instance, Lithuanian political leadership has devised 
plans to construct a nuclear NPP in Lithuania to replace the Ignalina NPP, 
which was closed on January 1, 2010 to fulfil the EU requirement. Sweden 
and Finland, while supporting the Baltic aspiration towards energy indepen-
dence from Russia, promote another approach — they push forward the idea 
of interconnecting the Baltic energy systems with Swedish and Finnish po-
wer generation sources, namely, the national NPPs. 
Energy dependence can be also understood as an effect of energy prices 
on the end user power prices for both industry and households. To replace 
power from Russia with a Finnish source (Estlink-1) almost doubled the 
price for Estonian households — from 0.0288 euros per 1 kW in 2007 to 
0.0488 in 2014 [3]. 
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If one believes in ‘energy dependence’, a question arises as to the limits 
of energy dependence and the degree to which a country can enjoy energy 
supply form Russia without becoming dependent. The authors and advocates 
of the thesis do not give any numbers or guidelines. Instead, they opt for a 
radical solution saying that efficiency can be attained only through refraining 
from importing energy from Russia altogether. In other words, a country im-
porting hydrocarbons and power from Russia is persuaded that any contact 
with Russia is dangerous, as if Russia were a carrier of a deadly virus. 
Let us try to establish the limits of energy dependence. The EU regula-
tions on renewable energy sources (RES) can be taken as a reference point. 
They are relevant, since it is difficult to forecast their reliability — elements 
of nature are not subject to human will. Each RES element — the sun, wind, 
and water — is unpredictable and thus there is a need for a reliable backup. 
Here, one can draw a parallel with the energy dependence motto. Until re-
cently, the EU set the 20 % renewable energy consumption requirement for 
the member states. At the EU summit held in October 2014, the 40 % re-
quirement was adopted. 
To a degree, these requirements can be interpreted as recommended en-
ergy dependence limits ensuring stable functioning of the economy. Let us 
consider the proportion of Russian hydrocarbons in the total EU energy im-
ports. They account for 34 %, which meets the parameters of admissible ener-
gy dependence; therefore, this should not raise any concerns. However, the 
advocates of the energy dependence principle do not provide any calcula-
tions, which makes a reasoned discussion impossible. 
The analysis shows that the Baltics policy of energy independence from 
Russia is not well grounded. It seems artificial, meant to replace Russian 
suppliers with Nordic ones (and Polish in the case of Lithuania). 
 
Banking 
 
In the past two decades, Nordic financial capital has dominated the entire 
Baltic financial market gaining almost complete control over Latvian (more 
than 60 %), Lithuanian (approximately 70 %), and Estonian (more than 80 %) 
banking sectors2. 
The first target of its Baltic expansion was loan capital. Nordic banks 
were extremely aggressive in offering credits to local businesses and house-
holds. Experts estimate the total private debt in the Baltics at USD 
60,000,000. Credit interest brings the Nordic creditors stable profits with a 
long-term perspective. 
Further expansion of the Nordic capital manifested in closely connected 
Nordic insurance, leasing, and consulting companies and pension funds 
penetrating the Baltic market. 
In these conditions, most attempts of the Russian capital to enter the Bal-
tic financial services market were not successful. For instance, the Russian 
insurance company RESO did not manage to stay in the market — it was 
                                                     
2 Proportion of Nordic banks in the national banking sector. 
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accused of violating the local legislation. The actual reason was that the 
company would build a large customer base among the Russian-speaking 
population of the Baltics. Lithuania’s Snoras bank controlling the Russian 
capital was nationalised in 2011. Having the largest network of branch of-
fices present throughout Lithuanian regions, it competed with the Nordic 
banks. The nationalised bank was transferred to Nordic banks with 50 % 
owned by the leader of Lithuania’s financial sector, Sweden’s SEB. 
The Nordic capital dominance on the Baltic financial markets is not a ta-
boo topic. It is discussed at the expert level and in political communities. A seg-
ment of the population (the ‘Nordic lobby’) views both financial and general 
economic predominance of the Nordic countries as beneficial for the Baltics. 
They argue that, in view of the 2007—2009 global crisis, the Euro crisis, 
of which the public only became aware in spring 2010, and the persistent 
turbulence in the world economy, it is the unofficial economic integration 
with the Nordic countries (primarily, Sweden and Finland) that can ensure 
the economic stability of the Baltics. 
This thesis seems plausible, if one considers Sweden, Finland, and the 
Nordic countries in general as immutable positive factors. However, a his-
torical overview and current events do not support such perspective. In the 
early 1990s, Sweden and Finland went through large-scale economic crises 
of their own. Some experts believe that the Nordic capital generated by the 
Baltic expansion was instrumental in overcoming this crisis. 
Today, central banks of Denmark and Sweden imposed a negative inte-
rest rate, whereas Finland sells bonds at a negative yield3. Both facts mean 
that these countries are experiencing problems in stimulating economic de-
velopment. In this case, multilateral economic ties between the Nordic coun-
tries and the Baltics become a channel for the rapid spread of crisis symp-
toms to both regions. They are so tightly integrated, after all. However, one 
might ask whether the Baltics have a mechanism for protecting themselves 
from any potential adverse effects. It seems that the Baltic politicians and 
economists — especially those pushing for more government regulation — 
are devising at lease some ‘preventive measures’. Still, today, there is no real 
opposition to the Nordic lobby in the Baltics, which has deeply penetrated 
both the policy-making and the economy of the Baltic States. 
 
Real estate 
 
Nordic financial groups have created an intricate financial structure in 
the Baltics, which includes real estate agents affiliated with the leading Nor-
dic banks. 
This structure develops such a real estate trading scheme, where Russian 
investors serve as buyers and Nordic companies as sellers. The Baltics be-
come a mere platform for transactions between Russian investors and Nordic 
businesses. 
                                                     
3 Four European countries follow this practice — Denmark, Switzerland, Sweden, 
and Finland. Three of them are Nordic countries. 
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Therefore, Russian investment in real estate does not move geographi-
cally but merely changes its owner. For instance, a Russian investor makes a 
deposit in a Baltic bank. In most cases, it will be SEB or Swedbank. Willing 
to purchase real estate in one of the Baltic republics, the investor contacts a 
company working in the Baltic market; a company most likely owned by one 
of the above-mentioned Nordic banks. The bank, which possesses informa-
tion about the client’s financial solvency — their financial capacities, i. e. the 
amount of their savings on the deposit — offers real estate options based on 
the investor’s preferences, interest, and capacity to convert the deposits into 
real estate. Schemes are set to encourage the client to act in the interests of 
the bank. 
Vulnerabilities of Russian investors can be considered in a broader con-
text. It is well known that most Russian investable funds concentrate in off-
shores. Their key weakness is that the Western banking community is often 
aware of the amount of funds and intentions of their owners. A good exam-
ple is the Cyprus banking rescue by the EU in 2013. Therefore, one should 
keep in mind that, in most cases, competitors become aware of the invest-
ment intentions of Russian offshore capital long before they are clearly for-
mulated. 
Consider a hypothetical situation: JP Morgan Stanley places funds in 
Russian banks under Russian jurisdiction and plans on investment on the 
Russian territory or into Russian assets. The answer to the question as to 
who will benefit from this situation — JP Morgan Stanley or its Russian 
competitors — is rather evident. The only thing left is to extrapolate this 
scheme on the relations between Russian investment capital in the Baltics 
and Nordic financial companies and banks operating in the region. 
 
Investment climate 
 
For Russia, Baltic investment climate is affected by two groups of fac-
tors. The first one is the local authorities, which regulate it using legislative 
tools. The 1990s and 2000s showed the growth of anti-Russian sentiments in 
the Baltics. It was stable and manifested in a biased attitude towards Russian 
foreign and domestic policies, as well as in a number of ambitious attempts 
to challenge Russian actions in the areas that have no direct bearing on the 
Baltics. 
Current situation in Ukraine is a good example. The Baltics, which ac-
tively support the EU sanctions against Russia, constitute a small group of 
states that not only uphold sanctions against Russia but also call for their 
tightening. 
Those interested in growing tensions between the Baltics and Russia try 
to present current confrontation as a traditional situation in Russian-Baltics 
relations. However, there is a clear difference in opinion between the Baltic 
leadership and population. The Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian officials 
have chosen anti-Russian sentiments as the backbone of their foreign policy. 
Nevertheless, the results of recent election campaigns in the Baltics show 
that the voters support the parties advocating normalisation in relations with 
Russia and good neighbourly relations with the country. During the 2014 
presidential campaign, D. Grybauskaitė — the embodiment of anti-Russian 
V. Olenchenko 
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sentiment in Lithuania — was re-elected with only a small majority in the 
second round. In Latvia, the Harmony party supporting the idea of equal dia-
logue with Russia won the majority of parliamentary seats. In Estonia, the 
Centre Party identifying the Russian vector as an integral part of Estonian 
foreign policy proved its popularity in the 2015 parliamentary election. 
The second group of factors affecting investment climate in the Baltics is 
of Nordic origin. Anti-Russian sentiments is supported by the Nordic banks 
in the Baltics. This support is often tacit. For instance, it is manifested in 
regular newsletters published by the banks in local languages and aimed at 
informing the general public about regional economic situation. As a rule, 
they include a section on Russia, which usually has a negative tone4. 
Yet another factor behind the increasing effect of the Nordic capital on 
Lithuanian financial market is the recently established Lithuanian Financial 
Markets Institute (Lietuvos finansų rinkų institutas (LFRI)) [4]. 
Its composition is rather interesting, since — as the Baltics financial 
segment in general — it is dominated by the Nordic capital represented by 
banks, investment funds, and financial consulting and investment manage-
ment companies 5[5]. 
The mission of the Institute, which seems to be vested with certain coor-
dination functions, is developing recommendations for strengthening the cur-
rent market situation. It is worth noting that competition is never mentioned 
as a business driver, nor is market stagnation resulting from monopolisation. 
In this context, of special interest is the Institute’s project to publish the Bal-
tic Financial Markets Handbook, which is meant to create an image of the 
market that would correspond to that of the Institute’s founders. The formu-
lation of the Handbook’s topics by the founders may serve as a pointer to the 
specialisation of the Nordic financial institutions in the Lithuanian and, pro-
bably, the Baltics’ market [4]. 
It is only logical that the members and founders of the Institute generate 
and implement ideas that increase and promote competitiveness of the Nor-
dic capital in the Baltics, i. e. they give the Baltic financial market the status 
of Northern Europe’s domestic market. In particular, this is the target of the 
Swedish financial groups dominant in the Baltics. 
In general, Nordic businesses treating the Baltic market as a segment of 
Northern Europe’s domestic market can be considered as both a warranty for 
Nordic investors and a warning for foreign investors from other regions. 
 
Significance of competitive experience 
 
Russian and the Nordic capitals represented in the Baltics have different 
experiences in overcoming competitive pressures in foreign markets. The 
first difference is the period of companies operations, the second are skills in 
external market development, and the third is PR. 
                                                     
4 SEB, Swedbank, and Nordea banks. 
5 Swedbank, DNB, SEB, Nordea, Lords LB Asset Management, Baltcap, Litcapital, 
Neries investicijos, KPMG, Opus Capita, Nasdaq OMX Baltic, Gild Coporate Fi-
nance, and Sorainen. 
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The history of Sweden’s leading bank Swedbank, one of the main players 
in the Baltic financial market, dates back to 1820 [6]. Another active player, 
Finland’s Nordea, was also established in 1820 [7]. However, Russian banks 
in the Baltics cannot boast such a long history. For instance, Russia’s SMP 
bank operating in Latvia was registered on April 11, 2001 [8]. The diffe-
rence in experiences of the Swedish and Russian banks is 191 years, which 
makes the SMP bank securing a share of the Baltic market a compliment to 
the bank. 
As to foreign market development skills, one cannot but stress that, in 
the case of Swedish banks, these are the result of operations in the domestic 
market. A specific feature of Swedish economy is strict governmental con-
trol aimed at ensuring 100 % employment rate and income equalisation. 
Therefore, Swedish banks develop and improve the skills of consistent and 
resolute overcoming of government pressure to enhance their positions. 
When expanding to the Baltic market, these skills became a competitive ad-
vantage of the Swedes who have managed to create conditions for promoting 
their interests (not to say that they were able to suppress the Baltic state ma-
chine entirely). Objectively speaking, the Russian capital has not fully mas-
tered the skills of competition in foreign markets. 
As to the PR effect, recent history has forged an association between the 
Swedish capital and the ‘Swedish model’, which stands for stability and 
prosperity. For a long time — since 1936 — it has been perceived as a mar-
riage of socialism and capitalism, which accounts for the interest in this 
model from the Baltics pursuing a transition from a socialist to a market 
economy. Global abandonment of traditional opposition of the socialist and 
capitalist ideologies has rendered the image of the Swedish model blurred 
and hard-to-understand. However, the idea has not lost its appeal [9]. The 
image of the Russian capital, on the other hand, has been constantly tar-
nished by the Western mass media — it has been accused of affiliation with 
the criminal underworld (early 1990s), a lack of stability (late 1990s), exces-
sive governmental regulation (early 2000s), corruption (late 2000s), and iso-
lationism and aggression (today). 
By all three criteria — operational history,, competitive skills, and the 
PR effect — the Russian capital looks less competitive than the Nordic capi-
tal. The situation can be remedied through investing in image-making and by 
studying the methods used by competitors. 
 
Differences in regional approaches 
 
Conceptually, Nordic countries see themselves as leaders in the Baltic 
Sea region, aspire to formulate the region’s policy and oversee its implemen-
tation. They substantiate their claim with the GDP data. According to them — 
which is partially corroborated by the EU — the Nordic countries account 
for 60 % of the total GDP of the Baltic region, whereas the northern areas of 
Germany and Poland for 14.5 and 5 % respectively, the Northwestern federal 
district of Russia for 14 % and the Baltics for 7 %. Of course, this methodol-
ogy is open to criticism, in particular, as to why the Nordic countries take 
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into account the national GDPs of their states and compare them to regional 
GDPs of the coastal territories of the other countries (except for the Baltics). 
They do not give a sufficient explanation and continue using this methodo-
logy [10, p. 39]. 
Sweden and Finland — the closest neighbours of the Baltics and Russia 
in terms of geography — use the following tactic. The idea of any regional 
Baltic association is usually discussed without Russia present. Its function-
ing mechanisms are developed without Russian participation. Russia is not 
invited to take part in the institutionalisation of such associations. As the as-
sociation becomes a legal entity under international law, Russia is offered an 
opportunity to cooperate and even accede to the organisation. Russia’s natu-
ral desire to formulate and promote its national interests is interpreted for the 
public opinion as Russia’s usual opposition to the Western community. Good 
examples are the Northern Dimension programme and the Strategy for the 
Baltic region [10, p. 40—45]. 
In this context, Nordic ambitions to secure economic dominance in the 
Baltics look like part of their general Baltic leadership strategy. Moreover, 
Swedish financial groups (Swedbank, SEB) identify the Baltics as a segment 
of their home market [6]. The second largest Finnish financial group, OP-Po-
hjola Group, views Finland and Estonia as a single market [11]. These ap-
proaches are not a secret. Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian officials do not 
refute these interpretations publically, in effect, admitting their accuracy. A fo-
reign investor willing to invest in the Baltics has the right to inquire about 
the regulation of the Baltic market and the development of conditions for 
free competition. 
As to Russia, the traditional term of ‘cross-border cooperation’ is usually 
used in relation to the Baltics. It means that economic interests of the Baltics 
do not have a wide geographical scope; they are often limited to the regions 
of the Northwestern federal district. This pattern is also applied to relations 
with Latvia. The country demonstrates pragmatism in relations with Russia 
more often than Estonia and especially Lithuania (see, for instance, the pres-
entation of Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov made at the 
joint press conference with Latvia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Edgars 
Rinkēvičs and the following discussion within the negotiation held in Mos-
cow on January 12, 2015) [12]. 
 
The role of the European Union 
 
After regaining independence in the early 1990s, the Baltics shaped their 
foreign policy in accordance with the aspiration to join the EU, which finally 
happened in May 2004. Within the EU, the Baltics have allied with those 
member states that do not show any enthusiasm for a political dialogue and 
economic partnership with Russia. 
Moreover, the Baltics and Poland are putting in a great deal of effort to 
instil distrust of Russia in the European Union and present the country as an 
unreliable economic partner. They promote the thesis that the EU member 
states have to follow a single confrontation-based policy towards Russia and 
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create obstacles to the Russian policy aimed at developing relations with the 
EU. This was especially pronounced in the implementation of the Nord 
Stream project aimed to construct a Baltic Sea offshore gas pipeline carrying 
Russian natural gas to Western Europe. The Baltic-Polish project of a gas 
pipeline running from the Caucasus fields to Europe (Nabucco) was intro-
duced as a controversial alternative to the Russian investment into the pro-
ject. The Nabucco pipeline was designed to reach Finland through Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia. The Baltics and Poland, supported by the Nordic coun-
tries, insisted that the project had to be given priority in the EU. Its creators 
hoped to deprive the Nord Stream of political and economic backing. 
The Baltics have treated Russian investment on their national territories 
similarly. Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian leadership strived to take the 
Russian assets into their ownership. A good example is the attitude of the 
Baltics to the implementation of Directive 2009/73/EC (the so called ‘gas 
directive’) stipulating that the member states should separate generation and 
sale operations from transmission networks. The Directive granted the Bal-
tics and Finland an exemption, since these countries were perceived as an 
isolated market. They were permitted to comply with the regulations on a 
voluntary basis. Moreover, 18 months were given for adaptation after the 
adoption of the Directive (September 3, 2009). Therefore, the Directive was 
due for implementation not earlier than March 2011. Baltic leadership ig-
nored both circumstances and initiated the process of unbundling and alien-
ation of Russian gas assets in spring 2010 [13, p. 372—375]. 
For Northern Europe, the EU membership of the Baltics is of interest for 
a number of reasons. In particular, it is something of a guarantee of inviola-
bility of Nordic investment in the Baltics and of stable profits. Moreover, it 
creates competitive advantages over capital originating from non-EU coun-
tries that are geographically and historically close to the Baltics. The rotating 
presidency of the Nordic countries in the EU gives opportunities to push the 
decisions beneficial for the Nordic capital through. For instance, the ‘gas 
directive’ adopted as an official EU document during the Swedish presi-
dency partially substituted Russian gas supply to the Baltics with that from 
Norway. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Conclusions can be divided into several groups. The first one concerns 
the Baltic market proper, the second — the relations between the Russian 
and the Nordic capitals, and the third one presents comments on conceptual 
framework for foreign investment abroad. 
As to the first group, the analysis of the situation concerning foreign di-
rect investment in the Baltics shows that the state of affairs is far from the 
free competition ideal. The market is overregulated by local authorities and 
monopolised by the Nordic capital, which complicates the access to the Bal-
tic market for investors that are not affiliated with the Nordic capital. It 
seems that the Nordic capital, although having exhausted most of its invest-
ment interests in the Baltics, continues to prevent other investors from ente-
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ring the market. In general, the Baltics market is mothballed by the Nordic 
capital, which results in chronic stagnation of the Baltic national economies. 
One can state that, under the influence of the Nordic capital, the Baltics 
are gradually transforming from a national market into a business space for 
interaction and competition of foreign capitals. In essence, this corresponds 
to the dominant Western idea of limited sovereignty of small countries — a mo-
dern offshoot of Euroatlanticism. 
As to the competition between the Russian and the Nordic capitals, the 
examples and schemes mentioned above indicate that the attitudes of the Nor-
dic capital towards the Russian capital can hardly be called fair competition. 
This gives rise to a number of questions that are not rhetorical at all. The 
first one is whether such attitude to the Russian capital is characteristic of the 
Nordic capital only in Russia or there is a need to be ready for similar treat-
ment regardless of time and place. Does it concern only certain types of the 
Nordic capital or is it a common national feature? Should the Russian capital 
take into account the Baltic experience of the Nordic capital everywhere or 
should it be interpreted as an unpleasant exception? 
For instance, Swedish capital in Russia does not always comply with the 
Russian legislation. So, the famous Swedish cosmetics company Oriflame 
was not able to refute the accusations of using a tax evasion scheme in Rus-
sia, which were made in the summer of 2014 [14]. Moreover, Oriflame calls 
for corporate solidarity of Swedish companies and appeals to the Swedish 
state to support the company. Ambassador Veronika Bard-Bringéus presen-
ted the special committee of the Council of Federation of the Federal As-
sembly of Russia with an ultimatum that if the investigation into the com-
pany’s actions did not stop, all 400 Swedish companies having subsidiaries 
in Russia would cease their operations in the country [15]. 
In these conditions, the Russian capital should act pragmatically and use 
competitive advantages over the Nordic capital where possible, primarily, in 
the CIS and within the Eurasian Economic Union. At the same time, one 
should not take the path of revenge, keeping in mind that there are other 
ways to respond to unfair competition from Nordic businesses. The beha-
viour of capital, as well as that of a human being, is guided by inherent or 
acquired reflexes. There is a need to assists the Nordic capital in developing 
an adequate strategy for the Russian capital, in particular, in abandoning illu-
sions of uniqueness and inviolability. 
At the same time, it is hardly rational to interpret discrimination against 
the Russian capital observed in the Baltics as a fault of the local authorities 
and the Nordic capital. There is a need to consider whether the Russian capi-
tal uses its full potential to protect its interest. The key competitive disadvan-
tages of the Russian capital in the Baltics seem to be as follows. The first 
one is depositing funds in banks of the countries acting as a direct competitor 
for the Russian capital, which immediately creates unequal conditions. The 
second one is the absence of a Russia-friendly financial infrastructure (con-
sulting, legal, insurance, and leasing services), which makes Russian busi-
nesses deal with companies controlled by a competitor, and has obvious 
negative consequences. The third one is the absence of a regional strategy 
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developed by the Russian capital. Moreover, different branches of the Rus-
sian capital are poorly coordinated. The starting point for improving invest-
ment conditions for the Russian capital in the Baltics might be the elimina-
tion of above-mentioned competitive disadvantages. 
The analysis of competition between the Russian and the Nordic capitals 
in the Baltics makes it possible to make a contribution to the theory of capi-
tal expansion into foreign markets (R. Vernon, J. Johanson). In particular, 
we have shown that the proposed dependence of capital expansion on geo-
graphically, historically, and culturally close markets is not universal. As the 
case of the Baltics demonstrates, this pattern requires formation of standard 
favourable conditions; otherwise, competition between foreign capitals will 
be marred by discrimination. 
 
This article, prepared at the Institute of World Economy and Interna-
tional Relational of the Russian Academy of Sciences, was supported by a 
grant from the Russian Science Foundation (Project No. 14-28-00097 Opti-
misation of Russian external investment ties in the conditions of a dete-
rioration in relations with the EU). 
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